Whom one considers a bastard depends, after all, entirely on one's definition of legitimacy. When the two laws accepted definitions at variance with each other the question came down to this: would the secular courts be bound to follow the canonical definition of legitimacy because of the acknowledged principle that the subject lay within the Church's jurisdiction? Or would the ecclesiastical courts agree that the secular law should prevail because land was the subject of the action? It is worth pointing out that this was not a problem confined to England. Although Continental jurisdictions, following more closely the Roman Law texts, were closer to agreement with the canonical definition of bastardy, the definitions were not always identical. 4 The conflict was not a strictly insular one.
I
For canonists, the question of how bastardy should be settled could not be without some degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, a decretal of Alexander III (X 4.17.1) stated clearly that a prenuptial child was legitimate and could not be disinherited for that reason. On the other hand, no matter how one dissected the matter, it came in the end down to a question of real property. A man sued not to have his legitimacy publicly proclaimed, but to recover land he thought belonged to him. And here canonists had to deal with another decretal of Alexander III (X 4.17.7) which seemed to say that feudal law controlled. This decretal grew out of an English case in which papal judges delegate had adjudged possession of land to a man whose mother (through whom he claimed the land) was challenged as illegitimate. Henry II objected strenuously to this invasion of his rights. He was, in the decretal's words "motus et turbatus." Because of that objection, Alexander III ordered the case returned to the royal courts. The matter of legitimacy alone remained to the Church, "although," the decretal says, the double procedure "may seem incongruous." The decretal does not authorise the royal court to go ahead without the canonical determination of bastardy, but it was to acknowledge that on the fundamental 4. For example, at Roman Law the consent of the parents was required to legitimate the child (D. 1.6.11). On this subject see Constant Van issue of what court should try ownership of the land, the secular court has jurisdiction. This the canonists themselves clearly perceived, as they showed by their efforts to distinguish it. One said that this second decretal applied only to cases of spoliation, not to claims for inheritance.5 Another said that because the events which gave rise to the decretal occurred before John had granted and received back his kingdom as a papal fief, it was no longer good law for England.6 But these convinced no one, not even their authors.
The canon law position had really to rest on the argument that the secular courts were bound to follow the canon law's determination of legitimacy for inheritance purposes, because of the inherent superiority of Church to State. This was the only clear way out of a logical impasse. Hostiensis took the occasion of commenting on the question to launch into the standard medieval comparison of the sacerdotium to the sun, the regnum to the moon, the obvious point being that the State, like the moon, was totally dependent for its light on the priestly sun.7 In truth, the situation raised exactly that problem. If the king were really the moon, he had no choice but to let the light of canon law settle the determinative question of bastardy. If the pope were the sun, there could be no question that secular law was derivative, subject to correction by the pope's law. Accept the premise, and the logical problem is solved. The Church courts should determine legitimacy for inheritance purposes. Hostiensis put it with clarity: "in no way does it belong to the secular court to judge, but rather execution and admittance of the legitimate person belongs to it." 8 In general, this was the position taken by canonists. There was, nonetheless, some appreciation for the arguments on the other side. Antonius de Butrio noted in his analysis of this problem 5. gl. ord. ad X 4.17.1 s.v. hac occasione: "Non est contra; ibi principaliter committitur causa super questione spoliationis, quae ad papam non pertinet inter eos qui non sunt suae iurisdictionis." that the Church should not disturb the jurisdiction of laymen, and that "it seems to detract from it to judge a case belonging to its judgement according to another law." 9 Joannes Andreae noted, though he did not unequivocally endorse, a more technical position favourable to secular jurisdiction. When, he wrote, bastardy was raised only "in the manner of an exception," the secular court could reasonably retain the case instead of sending it to the Church.10 And Panormitanus, in the fifteenth century, held that a man legitimate for canon law purposes would not ipso facto be a legitimate heir, since the "custom of the country" might stand in the way.11 Still, even for these writers, logic dictated that bastardy was a matter for determination by the tribunals of the Church.
The strongest sentiment mitigating the logic of the hierocratic point of view was the knowledge that, in the fact, it was not widely accepted. Joannes Andreae, after the passage just mentioned, went on to say that in principle the king's claims to jurisdiction over bastardy in inheritance cases might not be justified, but added that it was well to accept them, since "we do not wish to scandalize him." 12 And the marginal gloss to the standard glossa ordinaria noted, "But today in this kingdom the secular judge takes cognizance no matter what, and there is no remission to the Church." '3 As an appendage to his strong stand, Hostiensis wrote: "this, however, the legists hardly concede to us, but by strictness and natural reason I do not doubt that it is to be held." 14 9. Lectura super quarto decretalium ad X 4.17.7 (Rome, 1474), f. 86v: "Nota quarto quod ad iudiciu;n ecclesie non pertinet iudicare de temporalibus inter puros laicos et quod ecclesia non debet turbare iurisdictionem laicorum, quod detrahere videtur iuri alterius eo quod iudicat de causa ad eius non spectante iudicium." 10. Novella Commentaria ad X 4.17.5: "Verum tamen cum in modo exceptionis fuerit hoc oppositum coram iudice seculari, videtur quod sicut ipse cognosceret de exceptione que in suam jurisdictionem caderet sine libelli exceptione, sicut iudex ecclesiasticus qui in locum illius succedit sine libello procedere poterit." A useful discussion is contained in Inno- What had happened is that, on the Continent, the practice of sending questions of bastardy to the Church courts gradually disappeared.15 Beaumanoir, writing in the 1280's, gave it as the rule that in inheritance disputes secular courts in his area might make their own determination of legitimacy.16 The practice was not uniform in his day, but it was all but universal by the fourteenth century. The Church's theoretical rights were simply ignored. Canonists had little choice but to acquiesce in this decision and content themselves with the reminder that, by strict logic, the result ought perhaps to have been otherwise. Surely there were strong practical reasons for acquiescence. Reference to the ecclesiastical courts was time-consuming, necessarily irksome to the parties, and usually unnecessary. And when the subject of the ultimate dispute was, by the canon law's own principles, within the jurisdiction of secular law, the whole matter was not one in which the strictest sort of logic alone could control. This the canonists came close to admitting. They recognised the arguments on both sides and raised little objection to the fact that the "clerical" argument was not being followed.
In England, the Church certainly took this temperate position. What the bishops at Merton, following Grosseteste's lead, were unwilling to do, no matter whether they conceded that the royal courts could try bastrady, was to use their own courts to enforce the substantive position of English law. To sanction the use of their own courts to deny inheritance to a man who was canonically legitimate was quite a different matter from accepting, without great protest, that the English courts might do so. Practice prior to the Statute of Merton had required them to co-operate, in unmistakable fashion, in reaching that result. The writ from the royal justices asked them to specify whether the person had been born before or after wedlock.1s To answer this made them co-workers in English legal practice, whereas if asked merely to determine bastardy in general terms, the bishop's court could follow its own law.
Where an answer to a specific question on the cause of alleged bastardy was demanded, and we shall see that it was demanded in other cases besides that of pre-nuptial children, the bishops baulked. lost his case by canon law, and won it by English law.27 Whether in 1229 the bishops were answering the writ in specific terms, allowing the courts to apply the English rule of refusing to bastardize adulterine children, as they did with pre-nuptial children, or whether the royal justices were simply not alert to the difference, does not appear from the record. We do not know. But cases after 1234 show that the difference was being taken into account.28 Where bastardy because of adultery was alleged, the matter would not be sent to the bishop.
The reasoning used to justify the English law's unwillingness to bastardize children born of adultery is curious. Common lawyers were led to make some extravagant arguments in favor of a position which so clearly violated common sense. In this same case, it was argued that bastardy ought not be submitted to the bishop because "il purra estre delay per ans per appeals." In another case, reported Y.B. 38 Edw. III, Mich., f. 27, a lawyer complained that the party "aura grands delais devant l'Evesqe. Et si l'Evesqe ne vient pas accepter les proves, le party suera per appel, et aura long proces." These two cases also illustrate the Church's unwillingness to submit the procedure in its own courts to English law. Bracton argued, at f. 420, that there could be no appeal of a judgement on bastardy from the bishop to whom the king's writ had been sent. But it is clear that this rule could not be enforced against the bishops, for they Third, there were some other cases the royal justices refused to send to the church courts, although the two laws were not so clearly different in substance. If the bastardy of a dead man were alleged, the question was tried by assize, not sent to the bishop, without regard for the reason for the bastardy.38 If the legitimacy of one who was not party to the action was questioned (as where the title to land descended through, and depended on, an alleged bastard), the issue likewise went to a jury.39 In these instances, where no substantive difference in the two laws could affect the outcome, the English courts took a more restrictive view of ecclesiastical jurisdiction than principle alone warranted. The main reason they gave for the restriction was that non-parties would not be adequately represented before the Church court. In some ways, this seems more an excuse than a reason. The bishops could summon those who were alive, and the same problem of inadequate representation existed in trials by assize. It looks like a plain attempt to curtail ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
The Common lawyers had an answer to this charge. They said that in the royal courts, the bishops' certificates had a conclusive, pre-emptory force which jury verdicts did not.40 That is, a certificate of legitimacy or bastardy coming from the Church could not be challenged in a subsequent lawsuit, even between different parties. The verdict of jurors bound no one beyond the individual parties. Thus it was essential to hedge recourse to the bishops with procedural safeguards. If a man's legitimacy could be conclusively settled by the bishops in a suit to which he was not a party, he might be would not answer the writ if there were an appeal. In a case heard in the Common Pleas in 1277, the party who had appealed in the Church court was ordered to remit that appeal "si sibi videtur expedire ita quod episcopus procedere possit," C. deprived of the chance to bring forward all the proof he had. This is true because in a lawsuit in which he had no interest in the outcome, he would have little incentive to present his strongest case. Such, at any rate, was the lawyers' argument, and there is some cogency to it. The argument depends, of course, entirely on the effectiveness of the bishops' certificates in the English courts. And although the rule of conclusiveness was often cited and mostly followed, a number of cases show an unwillingness by the judges to enforce it when injustice or fraud would result. The Common law justices were sometimes tied to mechanical application of technical rules in the fourteenth century, but on more than one occasion they dealt freely with this one. In a case from 1337, for example, it was pleaded that the plaintiff was a bastard by reason of birth before his parents' marriage. The plaintiff countered by showing record of a bishop's certificate from a previous decision testifying to his legitimacy. The court, however, refused to accept it as conclusive. As Shareshull, J. said, "I cannot have this answer because with it a man would gain inheritance against the law of the land." 41 Even where the situation was not so clearly that of the Council of Merton, the justices were willing on occasion to disregard the rule. In Trinity term of 1354, another litigant sought to introduce a bishop's certificate from a previous action of formedon and was driven to answer when the court again refused to accept it. 42 A legitimate reason for the justices' disregard of the rule of conclusiveness was that it encouraged fraud on the English law. It was easy enough to set up one collusive lawsuit which raised bastardy without involving substantive conflict between the laws, get a bishop's certificate on the court records, then plead the certificate as conclusive when bastardy was raised in a subsequent dispute. It was a subterfuge, though not a particularly clever one. To allow it defeated a strong policy of English law. The justices were sometimes, but not always, willing to disregard the procedural rule of the force of the certificate. They invoked it freely as an excuse for limiting the jurisdiction of the Church courts, but were less ready to apply it when it meant the application of canon law to questions of inheritance of English land.
The foregoing restrictions of the Church's jurisdiction to determine bastardy were probably less important than a fourth, the distinction between proprietary and possessory actions. Maitland has pointed it out: only when the action went to the right would recourse be had to the Church to determine legitimacy. Otherwise, bastardy would be tried "in what we may call a possessory spirit," that is by assize.44 It is possible that this distinction was evolved after Bracton's time for there is no explicit mention of it in his discussion of bastardy, but it was an established part of English law by the end of the century.45
The justification for the rule is a familiar one, the same which had originally made possible the wide introduction of possessory assizes in the royal courts. Since it was theoretically always possible to follow a possessory action with a writ of right, no one could be obliged to have his legitimacy tried by assize. He could always sue later by an action going fully to the right, and the question would be sent to the bishop.
In this form, however, the argument is largely specious. The only class of cases which a party would especially want tried by the to a poorly worded and ineffective statute designed to curb the abuse Church were th,-se in which English and canon law were at variance. These, we have seen, it was the policy of the English courts to refuse to submit to the Church in the first place. Where the two laws were identical, it made little difference how the issue was tried. Thus, the result of the distinction between actions of right and of possession was, or ought to have been, to considerably restrict the number of cases which would be sent to the ecclesiastical tribunals. Actions of right were less frequent in the royal courts than possessory actions, so that the distinction, if rigorously followed, would have very largely removed bastardy litigation from the jurisdiction of the Church. We do know that it was not absolutely applied, for there were a few possessory actions which did in the event go to the bishops. But certainly, the distinction was very largely followed in the first half of the 14th century. 46 To summarize briefly, the practice of sending questions of bastardy to the Church at the start of the fourteenth century was this. A number of specific situations had been developed in which the royal courts would not, unless the parties agreed otherwise, refer to the ecclesiastical forum. They were of two sorts. The first included cases where a substantive difference in the definition of legitimacy existed. Children of adulterous liaisons, those born before their parents' espousals, and those whose parents' marriage had been dissolved came under this heading. The second consisted of cases where the refusal was based on procedural grounds. Bastardy of dead men and other non-parties, and most importantly, possessory as against proprietary actions came under this second.
Retention for trial by jury, we noted above, was a necessary step in the first class, a step required to vindicate the principle that English law, not canon law, should determine inheritance of English land. As to the second group, reasons could likewise be given for each of its categories, but especially with the right-possession distinction, the result was not at all required by English law, in the same way that keeping cases of pre-nuptial or adulterous children out of the bishops' hands was. Retention of the cases in the second class was rather a slightly veiled attack on ecclesiastical jurisdiction than a vindication of English principles of inheritance. And it had one unfortunate result. The wide use of the second class focused attention almost entirely on the form in which the claim of bastardy had been raised. some cases being sent to the Church which should have been kept by the royal courts. But we should also note that it opened the way for attempts to avoid sending to the bishops cases which rightfully belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This was possible through a series of verbal tricks. It began to be argued that if one avoided using the actual word "bastard" in the pleadings, jurisdiction could be withdrawn from the Church. Thus, allegations in such forms as these appeared: the claimant was "not of the blood of," or "his father never married his mother," or "he was not the son of," his alleged ancestor.52 Such pleadings neither raised any issue on which English law differed from canon law, nor amounted to anything more than a plain exception of bastardy. All they did was to avoid the use of the word "bastard," so that it could be argued that "special matter" had been introduced. This practice was senseless. The point of pleading special matter, a' Bracton had explained it, was to determine whether the case was one in which English law and canon law were different, not to give the party raising the bastardy issue the choice of which forum he wanted. 53 Of course, such "dodges" were not in every instance accepted. But it is clear that.they sometimes were, and the testimony from the Church's side makes it obvious that these cases were not going unnoticed. Most of the examples of this sort of pleading that we have come from the first part of Edward II's reign. And the lone ecclesiastical complaint, of which we have record, against trial of bastardy in the royal courts comes from just that period. At the Council of London and Lambeth in 1309, a petition to the King was formulated, objecting that "certain justices of late, if the exception is proposed before them in this form, 'he is not legitimate,' take cognisance of it in fact." The bishops asked that "notwithstanding the variation of the words, the judges desist from hearing such cases." 54 We do not know what immediate effect the petition had. Perhaps very little. All the same, attempts to evade ecclesiastical jurisdiction by mere "variation of words" do very largely disappear from the Year Books after Edward II's reign.
We should note here that it was largely by the use of such purely formal variations that jurisdiction over bastardy was with-drawn from the Church on the Continent. Rather than by frontal attacks on the rights of the Church courts, Continental jurists used indirect and technical distinctions to achieve the same result. Perhaps we should see in the English practices to which the 1309 Council objected the start of the same process in England. But, in the event, it was a road the English lawyers did not take. Having advanced some steps down it, the Common lawyers withdrew, leaving the English Church's rights unimpaired. Whether they did so because of the unfortunate results which had followed we cannot be sure. But it is certain that most of the confusion in the pleading which is found in the reign of Edward II on this issue had disappeared by the middle of the century. It is difficult not to see in this a growing understanding of the issues involved. And we must note that in the process the justices rejected the method of restricting ecclesiastical jurisdiction through purely formal variation in pleading. Here, at least, they did not show themselves jealous of the Church's jurisdiction.
If the Churchmen's protest, or judicial astuteness, gradually eliminated this particularly obnoxious trick, the possession-right distinction which had, by its emphasis on form, created a part of the climate in which such confusion could flourish was left untouched. Though it had doubtless kept a large number of cases out of the Church courts, the "possessory spirit" had led, like the others mentioned, to difficulty and some confusion. Solution came in 1364, in a case of novel disseisin from Surrey. It is worth setting out the facts. The original holder of the land in dispute had had two daughters. The plaintiff was the issue of one of them. The defendant had been enfeoffed with the entire piece of land by the other daughter, and was in possession. One daughter had, in other words, alienated the entire inheritance as if she held the fee, not simply the half which came to her by English law. Thus the plaintiff had a good claim to her mother's share of the inheritance, except that the defendant objected that she was illegitimate. If that were true, of course, none of the land could have descended to the plaintiff and the feoffment to the defendant was perfectly lawful.
For some reason, perhaps with prompting, the plaintiff asked for a writ to the bishop of Winchester to try the bastardy. The defendant demanded trial by assize, "since that has been the use up to now". Finch, J. agreed that this was the practice, but said he saw no good reason for it. Since, in fact if not in theory, "blood will be tried in a writ of assize for ever as well as in any other writ," the distinction did not seem sensible to him. "There is," he said, Finally, the matter was adjourned before the Court of Common Pleas, where the justices said (in the words of the Year Book), "We have taken advice of all our masters herein, and are all of one accord. As well in assizes as in other writs if bastardy is alleged against a party, it will be sent to Court Christian." 56 With that, they abolished a rule of practice which had been good law for at least seventy-five years. Thereafter, there were some attempts made by pleaders to get the justices to return to the old rule, but they came to naught.57
The happy issue of this decision was to concentrate attention once more on the substantive differences between English law and canon law. If a child were said to be born before his parents' marriage, the royal courts kept the case, whatever the form of the action. If bastardy was alleged generally, without special matter, then the issue was submitted to the bishops. In this decision lay some of the means for clearing away the confusion which On the question of conflict between Church and State, the significance of that decision is that it was taken actually in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. From the point of view of strict logic, the confusion might have as easily been cleared away by trying all bastardy cases by assize. This would have removed the problem entirely. And it was the attitude adopted in most Continental jurisdictions. Surely there was much to recommend it. But here, in the same year a Statute of Praemunire was adopted, the royal judges went out of their way to uphold, and in fact to increase, the extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Whether they did so from conservatism, piety, or good sense, I do not know. But they must have realised that the real issue of conflict between Church and State was over inheritance of land by children of questionable birth, not one of competition between rival court systems. On the substantive issue, English law would not yield. But in this instance at least, the English justices showed themselves far from wishing to diminish the jurisdiction of the Courts Christian in their own favor.
In conclusion then, it can be said that the story of bastardy litigation in the Middle Ages is one in which there were very real elements of disagreement between Church and State, but that this disagreement is perhaps overshadowed by mutual accommodation and even harmony. The Church found, we saw in the first part of this paper, good reasons within its own law not to push the elements of disagreement. Where inheritance of lay fee was the basic issue, the canonists and churchmen recognized the force, if not perhaps the unimpeachable logic, of the secular jurists' arguments. And the English courts, for their part, rejected several precedents which allowed avoidance of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over bastardy cases by formal or procedural techniques. They abolished a long-standing rule of procedure so as to favor ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
In this, the Common law courts give evidence of an important growth in sophistication and control of pleading which took place in the middle years of the fourteenth century. Coke, who professed to be quoting a judge of the reign of Henry IV, wrote that, "In the reign of Edward the third, pleadings grew to perfection both without lamenesse and curiosity, . . . , for before that time the maner of pleading was but feeble in comparison of that it was afterward in the reign of the same king." 59 The source Coke claimed for this assertion has never been traced. But the history of bastardy litigation gives some warrant for accepting its substance. 59 . Co. Lit. 304b.
